INTRODUCTION
There is no one fusing of information that meets the needs of all warriors. However, with concise, accurate, timely, and relevant information, unity of effort is improved and uncertainty is reduced, enabling the force as a whole to exploit opportunities and fight smarter. 
Tomorrow's Vision
Network Centric Warfare (NCW), information superiority, effects based operations, and asymmetric warfare are the latest "buzzwords" highlighting the "transformation" theme. What is the impact of this transformation process on the warfighters? The force structure of tomorrow will operate with intimately interconnected weapons systems and sensors. Technology has reached a point where all commanders can "virtually" be on the front lines of combat. A common operating picture depicting the front line battlefield actions and effects almost instantly at all levels of command will be the standard. The Commander-in-Chief through the civilianpolitical structure, and the Combatant Commands down to the component and unit levels, may all view the same data, which can be merely seconds old. This network of information, increased knowledge and resulting increase in capability not only offers many opportunities to enhance the execution of armed conflict but also presents many opportunities for failure. The risk is, the more virtual the battlefield presentation becomes, the easier it is for the chain of command to execute the battle from behind the computers and information systems.
Each service has prospered and been defeated in combat as a result of the control and execution of the use of force. Each brings unique strengths and different visions of how to accomplish a mission. The Navy has operated under the Composite Warfare Commander
Concept for decades, with the understanding that "Command by Negation" is key to operating and accomplishing the mission. 2 The Air Force has adopted the phrase "Centralized Command,
Decentralized Execution" and has proceeded to fight based on the trust and flexibility given to the lowest levels for executing the mission while maintaining the strategic and operational focus, coordinating and commanding campaigns and operations at the "component" level. 3 Losing focus on the decision making process may result in longer decision timelines, less flexibility, loss of situational awareness, frustration, and possibly defeat. We have only to look back to the some of the post-Desert Storm conflicts of the 1990s for illustrations of failure to effectively employ the military. The tragedy of Task Force Ranger in October 1993 in Somalia resulted in large part from senior political leaders denying a request by the Combatant
Commander for proper equipment to carry out the mission in rising threat conditions. 4 The execution of the Kosovo air campaign likewise provides lessons on command interference and decision making. Although some say we won the conflict in Kosovo, the lessons regarding decisions being made at higher headquarter and national political levels regarding execution of force highlight frustration within the military and excessive loss of life through a prolonged campaign. One can say that Kosovo was fought from inside the political arena in the United
States and the equivalent in the NATO nations. Execution of the conflict was controlled from the higher political and military levels. The result was a more distended decision loop and frustration amongst the military leaders, who were not able to fight effectively due to targets being untouchable and forces being publicly withheld from action.
In evolving to a higher level of battlefield integration, leaders at all levels must continue to understand and adapt to the emerging tools and not change some of the inherent principles of sound warfare leadership, namely Centralized Command and Decentralized Execution (CC-DE).
NCW offers a valuable integration tool to all warfare leaders. The NCW technology merges fused information with weapon systems, the human operators, and leaders to create a more powerful capability to employ force efficiently. The result is a coherent common operating picture throughout the command hierarchy. Leaders must wisely implement this emerging technology throughout the chain of command, while ensuring that decisions concerning the execution of military force do not rise to higher echelons or political levels in the command hierarchy.
This paper will focus on the transformation being ushered in by NCW as related to the philosophy of CC-DE. After defining CC-DE, this paper will review issues affecting the command and leadership environment, discuss Information Operations (IO), draw on theoretical principles of NCW, and culminate by merging he NCW concept (technology) with the CC-DE (leadership) principle. Given that roadmap, this study poses six questions. CENTRALIZED COMMAND -DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION 5 Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available forces. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat. 6 In reviewing Air Force and Joint Doctrine, I found no real definition of the CC-DE philosophy. Perhaps that is because the definition differs depending on the level within the command hierarchy. CC-DE spans the decision making spectrum from the strategic to the operational staff and tactical levels. Although the "Command" element remains similar at all levels, "Execution" at one level is vastly different than execution at one of the other levels. As introduced at the beginning of this discussion, CC-DE is not a pure black and white concept. In fact, considering in technological advances, the idea of CC-DE is becoming a blurred vision because of the amount of information available at all levels, enhanced processing capability across command elements, and the speed at which information is exchanged. CC-DE is thus better defined as the relationship between the command elements interwoven with a blend of strategic, operational, and tactical theory to achieve effective application of force. Depending 
Technology Impact on CC-DE
Technology is forcing major changes in theater command and control dynamics. Global information networks and developments in weapons and platforms have significant impact on the conduct of military operations. No longer are the weapon systems required to be stationed "in theater" to be employed. Various manned and unmanned aircraft and missiles deploy from distant locations while executing the combat plan.
As forces are spread beyond the theater, CC is essential for efficient use of the assets required for a given mission and to allow flexibility as the plan is executed. knowledge of who has the other pieces, CC provides a focus on the whole puzzle followed by a parceling out of the pieces, orchestrating a cohesive effort and maximizing all potential strengths while minimizing the weaknesses of the team. DE then allows the combatants to maneuver as necessary to achieve the desired effects, placing their piece of the puzzle into place more efficiently.
There are many analogies that can be used to highlight the effects of CC-DE at the tactical level, but one of the better analogies is derived from a comment in a paper titled into CC-DE, a group of kayakers, when approaching a larger rapid, will stop and "scout" the rapid from the bank, seeking to understand the dynamics of the rapid. As a group, the kayakers rely on the leader to determine the best course of action or the strategy for running the rapid, and interpret the nature of the rapid based on experience, knowledge, and information obtained by reading the river. However, once the kayakers return to the river and engage the rapid, the uncertainty principle sets in and each kayaker is forced to react to the dynamics of the river based on his own knowledge and skill to properly execute the tactics of navigating the rapid. 
Effective Leadership in CC-DE:
The effectiveness of CC-DE is also directly related to the effectiveness of the leadership within the chain of command. Some attributes of an effective leader in a CC-DE environment are:
* An understanding of the roles leadership plays at each level in the command hierarchy.
* An in-depth understanding of the dynamics in a given situation, which includes knowledge injected from superiors, and information provided from subordinates and other command elements.
* An understanding of the role of each unit, and their associated capabilities and limitations.
* A firm understanding of the vision, objectives and guidance provided by higher authority.
* An understanding of the available information systems, and associated strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities.
* Knowledge of doctrine and strategy to effectively employ the available forces.
* The ability to effectively communicate vertically and horizontally in the organization.
* An understanding of the specific level of conflict (whether total war or limited force employment).
Placing CC-DE in perspective, Joint Vision 2020 states:
… as new information technologies, systems, and procedures make the same detailed information available at all levels of the chain of command, leaders must understand the implications for decision-making processes, the training of decision makers at all levels, and organizational patterns and procedures. The potential for over centralization of control and the capacity for relatively junior leaders to make decisions with strategic impact are of particular importance. There are three reasons for prudent delegation in a high-tempo environment. First, many discrete decisions must occur simultaneously at each echelon, and there is little hope that a commander can successfully cope with even a minority of them. Second, capabilities remain idle when the leader and staff reserve too many decisions for themselves. Finally, centralization risks belated action because new and unexpected information is not understood in time. 17 The bottom line is, given political concerns in a limited conflict, the military organization will be forced into some level of CE at times, but this should be the exception. To be effective, leaders at the higher levels of command must understand the complexities of the internal political situation and effectively communicate throughout the chain to prevent CE from becoming the standard means of force execution. The idea of needless CE is highlighted in an observation from the battles in the Shahikot region during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
In March 2002, Predator drones provided… live pictures of ongoing combat operations as they evolved in Afghanistan. Though such images provided military commanders removed several thousand miles from the field with information and a first-hand, never before seen view of the battle, they also caused headaches for the commander of regular U.S. ground forces in Afghanistan who was overseeing the operation… [C]ommand personnel at higher levels, and operating in other locations, relayed numerous questions and much advice to the commander in the field in an attempt to contribute to the management of the battle as it unfolded. Understanding and communicating the commander's guidance, intent, and objectives is essential to maintaining a firm foundation to achieve CC-DE. As data and information are acquired and sorted, leaders at the central command echelons must process the information into knowledge and pass that to the executor. 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Information Operations (IO) and information superiority have risen to a higher priority in the warfighting vocation and are essential elements to achieving a true Network Centric vision.
Information is the linchpin for turning data into useable knowledge (refer back to Figure 2 ).
With the ongoing evolution in technology and speed of data exchange, IO has become a force multiplier to the battlefield commander. As will be discussed in the next section on NCW, IO is the keystone in the NCW bridge supporting CC-DE.
IO is "the ability to support the commander with a fused, all-source, and real time presentation of the battlespace, while at the same time complicating the view of the battlespace for an adversary." 23 IO improves "the commander's capability to observe, orient, decide, and act faster and more effectively than the adversary…"
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IO Management
Great strides have been made throughout the years to harness technology and the electromagnetic spectrum to enhance IO and provide real-time data to organizations. Various collection agents, sensors, and communication arrays allow data to be processed into useable information to enhance battlespace awareness and achieve a robust knowledge base.
Technological advances have also dynamically improved the ability to communicate across the theater and back to higher headquarters. Secure communications in voice and data networks, electronic mail, and messaging systems are commonplace. Data links that allow platforms to automatically report an abundance of information have been deployed. Information "grids" are overlaid, melding into common operating pictures, resulting in enhanced situational awareness by presenting a "global information grid (GIG)."
Information superiority, coupled with advanced technology, brings improved speed of information transfer, leading to an increased level of knowledge and thereby placing us inside the adversary's OODA loop. To ensure maximum benefit from IO, the data obtained must be accurate, relevant, timely, accessible, survivable, sustainable, and deployable. In other words, the IO "product must be responsive to the commanders needs."
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IO Vulnerability
Information superiority offers vast improvements to achieve battlespace awareness, but there are limitations that must not be overlooked. IO relies on a robust network of nodes, interconnected by data lines rapidly exchanging data to facilitate enhanced information across the force. Vulnerabilities and risk still exist in the information architecture of today's systems.
Protection of the data systems is a high priority, with redundancy and security interwoven at all levels to assure protection.
As communication and information systems have evolved, there has been a parallel evolution in countering and exploiting these systems from simple frequency jamming to intrusion into data systems and actual destruction of data by injecting viruses. The countermeasures and spy games to protect systems and take advantage of the adversary's systems are ongoing issues facing the intelligence community.
The principles of the 5 Ds (disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy, or deceive) 26 are essential elements in the information warfare strategy, just as in any warfare discipline. The adversary is focused on disrupting the integrated network and will attempt to attack each node. Intrusion, deception, denial of service, as well as disinformation and system failure, are all vulnerabilities faced by modern network system operators. Vice Admiral Cebrowski has stated,
[N]etworks are very robust… alternate routings, self-repairs, and rapid reconstitution tend to be characteristic of good networks. Beyond the structure of the network, operation of the network by knowledgeable professionals provides the other ingredient of robustness. The key, and the rub, here is to ensure that one's networks are, in fact, both carefully designed and skillfully operated. 27 Leaders in the IO arena continually seek ways to protect all elements of the information spectrum. In addition to built-in network defenses, a defense in depth philosophy prevails to ensure the information infrastructure remains adequately protected. Multiple access control algorithms help maintain security and provide information assurance throughout the military.
Encrypting data remains a basic tenant to security, and through enhanced processing algorithms and hardware "keys," data is somewhat safe from exploitation. Frequency agile systems strive to stay ahead of intruders. Systems such as TADIL J (Link 16) and CEC (Cooperative Engagement Capability) provide enhanced processing and exponentially greater security while offering faster data transfer and more reliable synchronization across platforms. In addition to other countermeasures, time-based and waveform technology also enhance security.
The "choke points" or nodes where information funnels into one location, whether ground relay station or satellite, are hardened against certain types of attack and outfitted with intruder detection capability. Redundancies are being engineered into the NCW architecture to ensure data is available to all participants, and communication centers have preplanned response procedures to enable other sites to pick up the "load" if they become incapacitated.
Even more threatening than the interruption to the information flow is a disparity in technology between users. Despite the explosion in communication and information technology, there remains a chasm across the armed forces for access to the new technology systems. Simply stated, there is not enough time, money, or equipment in production to outfit all units and keep everyone current with modern systems. The gulf between modern and dated systems continues to grow, leading to difficulties maintaining a common operating picture across the battlespace.
For example, the Navy currently is operating with battle groups that are still not fully TADIL J equipped. TADIL J has been operational since 1996; yet there remains a mismatch between assets. Some elements of a battle group continue to rely on older radio systems and TADIL A (Link 11) for primary information exchange, while other elements employ TADIL J and even CEC. Because of this mismatch, some relevant information is not pushed to the control center;
instead the information must be pulled by the control centers to establish a more coherent picture. This process is inefficient and frustrating to the warfighters who need to make rapid decisions. The systems disparity exacerbates the fog of war and introduces friction in employing force. The future portends great achievements in automated integration of data, but if there is a lag in equipping the forces or processing the vast amount of information, how effective is this technology?
Network Centric Warfare
Continual change and the need to respond to it compels the commander to carry the whole intellectual apparatus of his knowledge with him. He must always be ready to bring forth the appropriate decision. By total assimilation with his mind and life, the commander's knowledge must be transformed into capability.
-Carl von Clausewitz On War
Clausewitz understood that knowledge is essential to timely decision making, which translates into effective application of force to achieve victory. In this regard he presaged the effect of NCW, which is in essence elevating the last sentence of his quote above to a new level of warfare.
The NCW Concept
But what is this NCW concept? NCW has emerged over the past 15 years as a concept to explain the synergy of bringing information systems, sensors, weapon systems, command elements, and the human operators together to produce a coherent, stable and precise vehicle for taking the punch to the enemy while maintaining a strong defense. NCW creates superior situational awareness through the overlay of "three NCW grids--the sensor grid, the command and control or information grid, and the engagement or shooter grid -[which] combine to enable rapid, precise offensive and defensive action." 28 NCW then is best described as a tool to enhance operations by elevating weapons employment beyond a specific platform.
NCW enables platforms to share precise information in real time to allow full use of the array of weapons in a given theater. At the same time, NCW provides information superiority and the capability to see and better understand the larger operational picture. As a result, leaders are able to more rapidly align the larger combat vision and decide upon courses of action as events unfold. "The bottom line is a shared image of the battlespace between joint decision makers and warfighters at all levels with instantaneous sensor to shooter connectivity." 29 However, the NCW concept is not a means of enabling autonomous warfare. "To operate in a network-centric environment is not an objective or a goal of combat. Likewise, to operate network-centrically is not a strategy for conducting combat. Rather, network-centric warfare is a tool…" 30 By providing a greater fusion of information, NCW brings about a more rapid synthesis of knowledge. In turn, this knowledge is seamlessly integrated with existing platform capabilities allowing for more rapid decisions, enhanced targeting and greater flexibility in prosecuting the mission.
NCW has the potential to unite all aspects of the military into a seamless entity which will allow victory through precise and effective force employment, enhanced force protection, and reduced fog and friction of war. The strength of the NCW concept relies on a trust that the information is timely, reliable, relevant, accurate, and readily available to all participants to achieve effective decentralized operations.
NCW Limitations
While NCW operations provide early warning and weapon systems integration, which allows efficient employment of weapons, there are several issues that interfere with true NCW application. In addition to the prior discussion of vulnerabilities to IO, any network arrangement is subject to breakdown, and as the network becomes more complex and distributed, it becomes more vulnerable or fragile. 31 In recognizing the risk of over-dependence on the tools, the ability to operate independently (or at a platform centric level) must be maintained and practiced.
While redundancy and security of the network are being addressed in establishing the NCW construct, the warfighters must continue to train to function in a non-NCW environment.
Technology also continues to outpace the ability of the average operator and leader to master the complexities of new systems. As is demonstrated daily, technology can be frustrating as commands strive to keep pace with the changes. Few will deny the virtues of advanced technology in processing information and conducting operations, but many will also voice frustration with the ability to efficiently use the technology. Software changes and introduction of new tools with no training frustrate operators. Office networks continue to fail and email accounts become overloaded. Weapon systems bog down or become interrupted due to faulty encryption, failure of sub-systems, or unexpected faults in the programming. Interoperability challenges emerge during joint exercises and force deployments, and deficiencies hinder coalition interoperability, creating frustration and degrading effective force employment. Navy doctrine attempts to maintain a proper focus on these issues by distinguishing between command and control processes and systems.
We must make an important distinction between the process of command and control and the system that supports it -the process is more important than the system… uncertainty is inherent… and will never be eliminated altogether… professional leadership, realistic training, flexibility, and cohesive doctrine will all help the commander cope with uncertainty. 32 Understanding that NCW provides for more effective use of the military by taking advantage of advanced technology, the issue of disparity in capability again rises as a limitation in NCW development. Parallel to the discussion of information systems disparity, an even greater disparity arises between the U.S. forces and coalition forces with whom we operate.
Over the past decade there has been a continual shifting in the coalition force structure, Again there was an understanding and trust between the coalition forces, which made the arrangement work.
NCW Related to CC-DE
The NCW concept spans all levels of the military and must be understood by all leaders to maintain effective CC-DE. The strategic level leaders are provided with a more focused operational picture, which helps them formulate and revise strategy and communicate a clearer experience, the mind is trained to react and is relatively comfortable operating in the tactical environment. As the leader moves into the operational and strategic leves of warfare, the foundation of knowledge and instinctual reactions to a situation can become less comfortable, and the tactical background starts to push forward, influencing decisions.
Additionally, as technology matures and large amounts of real-time "tactical" information become the standard at higher headquarters levels, the commanders risk being pulled into the tactical engagements. The risk to the campaign when this occurs is loss of operational and strategic situational awareness. Even at the tactical level, I have seen mission commanders involved in Command and Control be pulled into specific engagements and lose the larger battlefield perspective, resulting in degradation of situational awareness, which in essence opens an avenue for the enemy to get through and land a punch.
In evolving to the NCW concept, the CC-DE relationship becomes more synergistic and has the potential to significantly enhance force application decisions between the various command levels. The example just cited can be used to illustrate the advantages of NCW when applied to CC-DE. Given the predator video feed, the Combatant Commander was able to make a split second decision to attack a tank column, which was suddenly discovered. The result was quick tasking of an asset to attack the tanks. In past conflicts, the F2T2EA may have resulted in a time delay and possibly a missed opportunity to attack the tank column while information was exchanged.
In future conflicts, the scenario can result in an even tighter targeting loop. Imagine the video feeding into the JFC and JFACC command and to a strike package on routine patrol. The strike lead, seeing the tank column, relays his intention to commit the strike package to attack.
The strike leader, having knowledge of the commander's guidance and intent, and ROE, coupled with specific mission tasking and the precise target location, immediately directs attack via a salvo of missiles (which have also received the exact coordinates along with information on the tank movement to allow precise targeting). The strike package then follows up with a clean-up effort because the video shows two of the three tanks being hit, but the third still maneuvering.
Imagine all this occurring in less time than it took to read this paragraph. NCW theoretically provides such capability while supporting the CC-DE philosophy.
In this illustration, the central aviation command authority was able to see the specific tactical picture and maintain operational situational awareness but did not need to specifically direct an attack. The strike package executed the mission by being proactive, based on understanding the situation while providing the quality assurance to ensure the mission was properly executed and completed. There was no reason for the higher echelons to micro-manage because they could monitor the events unfolding. "As we apply the concepts of NCW to the 'management' of battlespace information, we can expect that …everyone will be more knowledgeable about the battlespace." While NCW brings a transformation in the form of synchronized application of force, the leaders remain the key to managing this tool. The leaders at all levels in the command hierarchy must have a firm understanding of the capabilities and the risks associated with the technology.
CONCLUSION
They must understand that the fused Common Operating Picture, providing tactical level relief, has different application at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They must recognize that too much involvement (micro-management) can lead to reduced efficiency and loss of flexibility, as well as obstructive filters to communication.
NCW and IO are complex tools, and like any complex tool, they can incapacitate the operator who lacks the thorough knowledge and understanding to wield them effectively. The incapacitation can come in the form of strangled command relationships, loss of full battlespace awareness, or miscommunication resulting from overload and over-reliance on a given system.
Care must be taken to ensure this transformation in technology does not erode CC-DE.
To effectively incorporate the NCW concept into the CC-DE environment, devoted education and training across the command hierarchy is essential. This education must emphasize the proper functions and application of available technology as related to the strategic, operational, and tactical warfighting levels. Training should highlight the effects NCW can have on operations and illustrate the implications of using the available information to make tactical decisions at the operational and strategic levels.
NCW offers the higher echelons the ability to centrally execute operations; this must be the exceptional case. As leaders at the higher echelon are fed the real time tactical level information, they must keep in mind that they are training the future leaders. Therefore, they need to let those future leaders command and execute at the tactical-level. The leaders at strategic and operational levels need to exert discipline to keep human nature in check and not fall back to running the show at the tactical level, thereby maintaining battlefield situational awareness and using the tactical information to create a more focused vision of operations and strategy.
At the tactical level, the operators and leaders must understand the effects of NCW throughout the command hierarchy. NCW doesn't give a green light to execute immediately.
There are times when execution must be controlled and limited. NCW infused throughout the chain allows for better control and execution. The operators need to understand the relationship between strategy and tactics and trust their commanders to effectively employ the tools of war.
As the political leadership and military commanders struggle to adapt to the transformation being ushered in by NCW, the most important lesson learned through the ages must be kept in mind. Human nature, psychology, and communications are essential elements in the application of power. The human element is the most difficult aspect of effectively integrating technological advances. Education, training, practical experience, and trust in each other will allow safe navigation through the uncertainty of the whitewater rapids of modern warfare. 
